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The Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement has, in less than
ten years,1 established itself as one of the more formidable move-
ments in legal and constitutional analysis. That it is less than ten
years old makes it by definition new wave. The claim that it consti-
tutes a rebirth of utopian socialism is made on the basis of similari-
ties that can be found between CLS and the utopian socialism of
Fourier and Owen. One could certainly point to a number of radical
thinkers other than Fourier and Owen, including Babeuf and Saint-
Simon, for purposes of comparison. As this author reads CLS litera-
ture, 2 however, with its emphasis on community, its attacks on liber-
alism and individualism, its critique of the law and the legal order,
and its challenge to the social hierarchy and demand for a funda-
mental change in human relations, the visions of Fourier and Owen
spring to mind. In both one can see an emphasis on community, an
interest in social, or collective, happiness as opposed to individual
* Director of Honors Program, Marywood College; B.A., Eastern Illinois University
(1969); M.A., Southern Illinois University (1971); Ph.D., Southern Illinois University (1973);
M.P.A., New York University (1982). The author originally prepared this paper for a Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar conducted in 1985 by Professor Joel
Grossman at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The author would like to thank the En-
dowment for its support and Professor Grossman for his encouragement. In addition, the au-
thor wants to thank his student assistant, Karen Jane Necker, for her invaluable assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1. The movement dates generally from 1977.
2. Some of the leading articles in CLS literature are as follows: UNGER, LAW IN MOD-
ERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court,
92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980);
Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical
Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitu-
tional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Tushnet, The Dilem-
mas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981); Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV, 781
(1983); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981); Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). For a very useful intro-
duction to CLS and a selection of representative articles, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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happiness, a critique of social hierarchies except, perhaps, those
based on age, and a challenge to laissez-faire capitalism and liberal
democracy. In addition, both movements maintain, in general, that
people are by nature good, that they have been corrupted by society,
and that changes in the social environment are necessary to restore
the natural goodness inherent in human beings. The purpose of this
Article, however, is not to defend a thesis which argues that CLS
constitutes little more than a re-awakening of a political pipedream.
This author believes that an article finding parallels between the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century utopian socialist
thought of Fourier and Owen and the late twentieth century phe-
nomenon of CLS would prove enlightening. Nevertheless, the goal of
this Article is less ambitious. Its purpose is twofold: (1) to define and
to delineate a set of characteristics that, taken together, explain the
overriding philosophy of CLS; and (2) to offer, from a general per-
spective, some criticisms that strike at the fundamental philosophical
themes of CLS. It is the contention of this Article that, unless CLS
modifies its goals and desires, its fate will parallel the fate of
Fourier's Brook Farm and Owen's New Harmony.3 If CLS continues
its assault on society, including society's legal order, at the same
level of intensity it has demonstrated over the past five years, then it
is possible that the movement will fade into a minor chapter in a
historical treatise on anachronistic approaches to social organization
based on visions of utopian socialism. This unfortunate result would
prevent a serious consideration of those CLS claims that are worth-
while. Thus, to avoid anonymity, CLS must modify its charges, form
alliances, and remain content with piecemeal gains. To provide sup-
port for this claim, it is first necessary to examine CLS philosophy.
II. The Theory
While CLS literature is quite varied and diffuse, it is possible to
describe generally common strands of CLS theory. Inasmuch as
CLS claims that traditional legal scholarship at its best constitutes a
futile effort to shore up a disintegrating and moribund philosophy
(liberalism) or at worst an illegitimate and counterproductive quest
for the legitimacy of judicial review,4 some effort must be made to
organize the leading issues inherent in this relatively nascent move-
3. See E. WILSON, To THE FINLAND STATION 102-15 (1972).
4. Brest, for example, writes: "I shall argue that the controversy over the legitimacy of
judicial review in a democratic polity . . . is essentially incoherent and unresolvable." Brest,
supra note 2, at 1063; see also The Politics of Law, supra note 2, at 4, and articles by
Tushnet, supra note 2.
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ment. Rather than attempt to catalog CLS themes,' this Article will
set forth narratively the theory emerging in CLS literature. At the
end of that narrative, a summary of the leading ideas will be
presented.
CLS focuses its major analytical efforts on liberalism in an ef-
fort to delegitimize, demystify, unmask, or trash it.6 "The Critical
Legal Studies movement is not committed at any level to liber-
alism." Analytically and historically, liberalism refers to the tradi-
tion of political philosophy rooted in the social contract theories of
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. Phillip Johnson describes the tradition as
follows:
Liberal political theory in this sense assumes that society is com-
posed of autonomous individuals whose values are based upon
subjective desires. It aims not to transform those values but to
accommodate them through institutions like the free market,
majority rule, collective bargaining, the social contract, and the
United States Constitution. It assumes that a society made up of
such individuals has common values, or at least can agree on
procedures to resolve value conflicts when they do exist.8
Mark Tushnet provides the following description:
In its unadorned Hobbesian version, liberal theory begins with
the premise that each of us desires as much as he or she can
obtain. We are inclined to grasp everything within reach, with-
out regard to the desires or interests of others. Nevertheless, we
recognize that our desire for more will generally be thwarted in
the war of all against all. Liberal theory proposes that we solve
this dilemma by surrendering some of our autonomy to the state
in exchange for security of our possessions. That surrender cre-
ates the new danger, however, that the state will exercise the
power that we give it in ways that reduce both our possessions
and our security. The rule of law is our protection against the
state. The state must be constrained by rules that are indepen-
dent of the desires of those charged with applying them in order
to protect individual autonomy and prevent the state from be-
coming another weapon for partisans to use in the general war.
5. Louis B. Schwartz has already compiled such a catalog. See Schwartz, With Gun and
Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984).
6. These terms are used interchangeably to capture the idea that liberalism, and espe-
cially liberal legalism, has been used to cover up - and contribute to - inequalities, inequi-
ties, and injustices and to perpetuate the status quo. For a detailed discussion of liberal legal-
ism, see infra notes 37-69 and accompanying text.
7. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 2, at 627.
8. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 256 (1984).
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The acquiescence of individuals to the liberal rule of law de-
pends upon their continued unshakeable faith in its objectivity.
Thus the conflict between objectivity and subjectivity cannot
readily be confronted within the legal sphere without undermin-
ing liberal society itself.
Thus, there are contradictions in liberalism that it is incapable
of overcoming or satisfactorily resolving and these contradictions will
eventually be its undoing. One of the tasks of CLS is to describe
these irresolvable contradictions. For example, the liberal tradition
exhibits contradictions between individual and community, subjectiv-
ity and objectivity, active rights (rights to liberty) and passive rights
(rights to security), and, for purposes of constitutional interpretation,
a commitment to democracy and an endorsement of the an-
tidemocractic practice of judicial review. For clarification purposes,
a brief description of two of these contradictions of liberal theory
will indicate why they are irresolvable.
Since Hobbes, the liberal tradition has focused attention on the
individual. Indeed, social contract theory begins with the assumption
that the state of nature is such that each person is his own
lawmaker, and that life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short."' 1 In this state of nature, to have all and do all is lawful for
all." In such a state, life is governed by a right of nature that allows
individuals to use whatever is within their power to preserve them-
selves. Ultimate protection, however, can eventually be seen residing
in a community of individuals sharing equally in the distribution of
benefits and burdens of social life. One might ask how a collection of
individuals can ever come to share equally in communal life. For
that to occur, individuals must be transformed into communitarians
with a focus on communal rights and responsibilities rather than on
individual rights and responsibilities. Liberal theory, unfortunately,
remains committed ideologically and philosophically to the concept
of individual rights. Thus, liberalism will never be able to reconcile
the individual-community dichotomy. After all, is it not a contradic-
tion to speak of a community of individuals?
The same general difficulty holds for the tension between active
rights and passive rights. There are, interestingly enough, two
problems here. First, these rights pose a conflict for the individual
itself. For example, the individual wants the liberty (active right) to
9. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship, supra note 2 at 1206-07.
10. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (M. Oakeshoot ed. 1960).
1I. See generally id. at 83-84.
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do whatever he wants without outside interference. By the same to-
ken, the individual wants to be sufficiently secure (passive right) so
that he can do whatever he wants to do. But, if one individual is
secure enough to do whatever he wants to do, then a second individ-
ual may not be able to do whatever she wants to do. Security, how-
ever bounded, precludes unbounded liberty. Similarly, if one's liberty
is unbounded, then he or she will not have sufficient security to exer-
cise that unbounded liberty. This conflict within the individual is a
conflict of liberalism. Once again, it is the liberal emphasis on the
individual that generates this irresolvable conflict. Second, these
rights pose a conflict between individuals within society. For exam-
ple, the more passive rights A has, that is security, the fewer active
rights, that is, liberty, B has. For every liberty A has, B has a corre-
sponding insecurity, and vice versa. Each individual wants both free-
dom and security. For every freedom one person has, however, some-
one else lacks security. Can this dilemma be resolved? It cannot be
resolved within the constraints of liberalism for that tension is part
of the theoretical landscape of liberalism. Once again, people must
overcome liberalism if they expect to lead rich, meaningful lives. In-
deed, there is a sense in which a society must go beyond freedom
and security if its inhabitants expect to live a life that is distinctly
human.'"
The liberal tradition since Hobbes, however, has made numer-
ous efforts to balance, if not resolve, these ineluctable dualities. The
results have always been the same, namely, the suppression and ma-
nipulation of humanity and the deification of the status quo behind a
veil of rationality and objectivity. CLS contends that
the liberal approach [to social justice] tends to rationalize op-
pression rather than to cure it. This is because liberals underes-
timate the degree of social conflict and the extent to which the
privileged classes can manipulate "neutral" governmental
processes to their own advantage. Liberals also make an arbi-
trary distinction between public and private compulsion, which
fosters an illusion that people are free when government is re-
stricted. Once the smoke-screen of liberalism has been lifted, we
will recognize the underlying oppression and alienation inherent
in modern society, and then we will become able to conceive of
new forms of human association that do not involve domination
and hierarchy. 18
12. In this context it would be worthwhile to compare B.F. SKINNER. BEYOND FREEDOM
AND DIGNITY (1972).
13. Johnson, supra note 8, at 256-57.
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The way in which CLS lifts the liberal smoke-screen is by taking an
area of law, or specific legal doctrine or concept, and exposing the
contradictions and questionable assumptions implicit in the liberal
analysis of that area of law or with respect to that particular legal
doctrine, theory, or concept. The only way to unveil the liberal mask
is to "step outside the liberal paradigm" 14 and focus on "concrete
areas of law, unpacking them, and exposing their particular presup-
positions." 10 Some of the most interesting CLS work has been done
in pursuit of that goal.16 The following three examples serve to eluci-
date the kind of analysis and conceptual work in which CLS is
engaged.
17
David Kairys, in his essay Legal Reasoning,8 seeks to elucidate
the idea of legal reasoning and one of its most traditional concepts,
stare decisis. Legal reasoning, for Kairys, constitutes little more
than a clever technique by means of which the true nature of legal
decision-making, that is, law as politics, is buried. Commenting on
the Supreme Court decision in Hudgens v. NLRB, 19 Kairys writes:
"There is no legal explanation in any of this; the law has provided a
falsely legitimizing justification for a decision that is ultimately so-
cial and political."20 In essence, "[t]he problem is not that courts
deviate from legal reasoning. There is no legal reasoning in the sense
of a legal methodology or process for reaching particular, correct re-
suits. ' '2 I Appeals to stare decisis provide the legal system with an
appearance of neutrality, objectivity, and quasi-scientific standing. 2
That appearance continues to provide deception for the reality,
namely, that the exercise of law is primarily a political act. As stated
by Kairys:
In sum, stare decisis, while integral to the language of legal dis-
course and the mystique of legal reasoning, serves a primarily
ideological rather than functional role. Nor is there any more
validity to the notion of legal reasoning when the source of law
14. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1237
(1981).
15. Id.
16. See supra note 2.
17. See Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW II (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 65 (D. Kairys ed.
1982); Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 242 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
18. Kairys, supra note 17, at II.
19. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
20. Kairys, supra note 17, at 14 (emphasis in original).
21. Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 1, 3 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
22. See Kairys, supra note 17, at 16.
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is a statutory or constitutional provision or the language of an
agreement. Courts determine the meaning and applicability of
the pertinent language; similar arguments and distinctions are
available; and the ultimate basis is a social and political judg-
ment. Indeed, even the facts relevant to a particular controversy
(largely reduced to uncontroversial givens in law schools) are
not capable of determination by any distinctly legal or nonpoliti-
cal methodology. Law is simply politics by other means.2"
Karl Klare demonstrates the analytical and conceptual program
of CLS in his essay "Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law. "2'
Klare maintains that, while the law has protected workers' rights in
some areas, that protection has come at the expense of worker auton-
omy in other areas.25 It appears that workers were once asked the
following kind of question: Would you rather have certain rights pro-
tected, such as those relating to health, safety, job security, and de-
cent pay (terms and conditions of employment) or would you prefer
the opportunity to exercise freedom in the industrial marketplace?
Such an offer would clearly constitute a bifurcation and as such it is
illogical. After all, why is it that workers cannot have freedom and
security? Klare demonstrates the role of CLS in uncovering the hid-
den agenda of law's participation in human affairs or in unveiling
the unconscious reality that has developed with the unwitting sup-
port of law.
The endeavor [of CLS] is to uncover the moral and political
vision embedded in the doctrine [of labor law], the values and
images of justice and workplace rights that the [legal] cases
evince . . . .An effort of this kind reveals that labor law is
animated by a powerfully integrated set of beliefs, values, and
political assumptions, liberal political assumptions. The labor
movement, or at least much of its leadership, has to a large ex-
tent internalized this vision. Labor law values form an aspect of
the collective unconscious of the American labor movement.
Many labor leaders accept a set of definitions of what is possible
and desirable in the workplace that stands as a barrier to indus-
trial freedom.
26
Thus, labor law, and specifically collective bargaining, is analyzed
23. Id. at 16-17. In another essay in the same book, Kairys takes the same basic ap-
proach, namely, that law serves to cover up the social and political reality of what is going on.
One of the concepts under scrutiny in this essay is that of the "clear and present danger"
standard. Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 140 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
24. Klare, supra note 17.
25. See id. at 70-72.
26. Id. at 73.
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and criticized "to progress toward freedom in the workplace. '27 Af-
ter all, "the collective bargaining agreement is the legal form by
which organized employees consent to their own domination in the
workplace. "28
David Rudovsky's "The Criminal Justice System and the Role
of the Police' 29 provides, in part, a CLS analysis of police practices
in contrast to contemporary public opinion. For example, regarding
police conduct, "the popular perception is not of an uncontrolled po-
lice force but rather of police who are handcuffed by the courts, thus
allowing the crime rate to spiral." 30 In an all-too-short essay, Rudov-
sky outlines the bankruptcy of that perception. He argues that the
court-imposed limitations on police power, such as that exercised in
Miranda v. Arizona 3' and Mapp v. Ohio,32 are conveniently and
cleverly sidestepped by police, with the assistance of law. Yet the
public perception that police are hamstrung in their efforts to do
their job remains. For example, the exclusionary rule is perceived as
a threat to achieving proper police protection. Rudovsky writes:
The attack on the exclusionary rule is an example of the way the
public's perception of the criminal process has been consciously
manipulated. The distortion of the actual impact of this rule on
conviction rates and (if, in fact, any relationship exists) on pub-
lic safety diverts the focus from the illegal police conduct and
leads the public to believe that constitutional principles are too
dangerous to enforce."3
It is equally difficult to bring and to win law suits against police or to
initiate criminal prosecution of police. All in all, the legal system,
even while maintaining the guise of a liberal proponent of the under-
dog, serves to secure and to perpetuate the status quo:
No one can dispute the fact that there are some particularly
abusive police, but the failure of the criminal justice system to
provide meaningful controls on the exercise of state-sanctioned
force should be understood as a deliberate political judgment to
free the police to control the streets and enforce the status quo.
This policy in turn results in the subordination of equality and
fairness to the preservation of order.34
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rudovsky, supra note 17.
30. Id. at 246.
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Rudovsky, supra note 17, at 247.
34. Id. at 250.
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Once unmasked, liberalism, or as Tushnet has irreverently
called it, "the party of humanity,"3 5 will be seen as a movement
which has managed to formalize and to institutionalize the very so-
cial structures that makes the attainment of its aims impossible. Lib-
eralism has not, however, done this consciously and deliberately; the
liberal tradition embodies high ideals and manifests good intentions.
It fails to achieve meaningful change in human relations primarily
because it cannot escape the aforementioned contradictions it has
created for itself. After all, it is now virtually four hundred years
since Hobbes, Locke, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlight-
enment gave shape to the liberal dreams of secularism, toleration,
liberation, democracy, reason, and laissez-faire economics. Today,
life can still be characterized as one of domination and exploitation,
as exhibited throughout our social order and in our social relations.
Society may have more things - life may be materially better -
but it has failed to transform social relations. While one may argue
that capitalism fosters relations of dominance and dependence, liber-
alism is the primary theoretical construct that must be unmasked
because liberalism reinforces economic realities by encouraging be-
lief in society's ability to "tinker" with the system to improve it. No
amount of "tinkering," however, will change the fundamental struc-
ture of today's society. That is why liberalism must be unmasked,
delegitimized, demystified, and trashed. According to CLS, the ten-
ets of liberalism must be critically examined so as to recognize that
it is liberalism that distorts and masks reality; it is liberalism that
provides false hopes and holds out empty promises to people in
search of a more humane society. Liberalism does not merely fail to
solve society's problems; it actively contributes to them. Liberalism
must be trashed and delegitimized so that society can begin to
achieve a more meaningful sense of self, community and justice.
Freeman, for example, explains the goal of trashing as follows:
The goal of trashing, however, is not liberation into nihilist res-
ignation . . . .The point of delegitimation [trashing] is to ex-
pose the possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities
of fashioning a future that might at least partially realize a sub-
stantive notion of justice instead of the abstract, rightsy, tradi-
tional, bourgeois notions of justice that generate so much of the
contradictory scholarship. One must start by knowing what is
going on, by freeing oneself from mystified delusions embedded
in our consciousness by the liberal legal world-view. I am not
35. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (1984).
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defending a form of scholarship that simply offers another af-
firmative presentation; rather, I am advocating negative, critical
activity as the only path that might lead to a liberated future.3 1
The first and primary part of CLS theory, then, is to confront
liberalism and its claims to social and political legitimacy. Intimately
related to this idea is the relation between liberalism and the legal
order. Liberalism manages to cloak itself in the veil of the rule of
law, thereby exacerbating social problems. Liberalism and the rule
of law combine to form what is known as liberal legalism. Liberal
legalism must also be delegitimized.
Liberal legalism has been defined by Trubek as a view of law in
society whose adherents "believe that the legal orders of capitalist
societies can achieve autonomy and generality, and that, in so doing,
they will necessarily secure equality, protect individuality, and
achieve community,"37 which of course, they will not and cannot.
More specifically, legalism refers to an "ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relation-
ships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules."3 8 Liberal
legalism is a particular, historical version of legalism that "serves as
the philosophical foundation of the legitimacy of the legal order in
capitalist societies."3 9 Klare explains liberal legalism further as
follows:
Its [liberal legalism's] essential features are the commitment to
general democratically promulgated rules, the equal treatment
of all citizens before the law, and the radical separation of
morals, politics and personality from judicial action. Liberal le-
galism also consists of a complex of social practices and institu-
tions that compliment and elaborate on its underlying. . . juris-
prudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form,
these include adherence to precedent, separation of the legisla-
tive (prospective) and judicial (retrospective) functions, the obli-
gation to formulate legal rules on a general basis (the notion of
ratio decidendi), adherence to complex procedural formalities,
and the search for specialized methods of analysis ("legal rea-
soning") . . . .The rise and elaboration of the ideology, prac-
tices, and institutions of liberal legalism have been accompanied
by the growth of a specialized, professional caste of experts
36. Freeman, supra note 14, at 1230-31.
37. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and ;he Chal-
lenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, II LAW AND Soc'y REV. 529, 551 (1977).
38. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964).
39. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Le-
gal Consciousness, 1937-1941 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 276 (1978).
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trained in manipulating legal reasoning and the legal process."
Liberal legalism, then, fosters a commitment to the concept of
the rule of law. That concept suggests that law is independent from
the social-political world in which it is found. Insofar as people ac-
cept a presumed independence, and rationality,"1 of law and the cor-
responding legal order, liberal legalism legitimizes a political order
that operates to the detriment of some (the have-nots) and to the
advantage of others (the haves). People come to accept the rule of
law implication that a legal system or structure objectively and for-
mally adjudicates social disputes. To liberal legalists, an indepen-
dent, formal, rational, and objective law exists to resolve social di-
lemmas. It is through this legal system - a system that appears
"uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable""2 - that social order and hi-
erarchy unfolds and is reinforced. Gordon explains how this phenom-
enon occurs by reference to Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony.
This concept maintains that "the most effective kind of domination
takes place when both the dominant and dominated class believes
that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is satis-
factory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect,
because things pretty much have to be the way they are." ' The
problem, of course, is that it is impossible to find a formal, objective,
and rational legal order. That, however, is a somewhat controversial
claim. To provide support for the claim that no formal, objective,
and rational order exists, CLS engages in deconstruction.
Deconstruction essays constitute efforts to expose the myths of
liberal legalism; it is liberal legalism, after all, that erroneously as-
sumes a legal model of rationality, objectivity, formalism, and inde-
pendence. Deconstruction has been defined as holding
that a text lacks a single, objectively determinable meaning. A
text's only meaning is the one given by the interpreter, who in
turn always reads the text against a particular social and politi-
cal backdrop. From the Deconstructionist's point of view, to
speak of a value-neutral interpretation is to speak nonsense.
Thus the Deconstructionist will take a text apart, seeking to ex-
40. Id.
41. In defining law as fundamentally patriarchal, Diane Polan argues that it is, in part,
the legal system's "undeviating bias in favor of rationality over all other values" that defines it
as patriarchal. See Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
294, 301 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
42. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281, 286 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
43. Id.
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pose the fallacies and contradictions in the "approved" interpre-
tations and to show how these past efforts at interpretation are
deeply imbued, whether consciously or not, with the values of
the interpreters.44
Deconstruction enables one to discover a malignant reality behind a
benign appearance. Deconstruction reveals the liberal legalist pre-
sumption of a knowable, objective, value-neutral, and rational law or
legal order as representing a distortion of what in fact exists. Decon-
struction essays delegitimize liberal legalism."' One finds, for exam-
ple, that "[tihere is no legally required rule or result, and despite
endless attempts by judges and legal scholars to find transcendent
legal principles, there simply are none.
4"
Essays in deconstruction generally demonstrate this method
through constitutional case analysis. The deconstructionist proceeds
by demonstrating the indeterminacy of the text under review, by
showing that there is no single way to achieve legal consensus as to
the text's meaning, and, despite textual indeterminacy, by revealing
that Supreme Court decisions do not vary radically from the prevail-
ing opinions in the social-political order. The odds that an objective
Court could take an indeterminate text and still render decisions
that generally reflect social norms are astronomical. That the Court's
decisions so closely parallel the prevailing sentiments of society indi-
cates that the judicial decision-making process is less than objective,
rational, and formal. Those few cases in which a deviation appears
reflect at best the Court's need to appear neutral.47 Thus, decon-
struction explodes objectivism and formalism. At this point, one
should ask what these terms really mean and why must they be
trashed. The clearest definitions of objectivism and formalism come
from Unger and merit restatement. Unger writes as follows:
What I mean by formalism . . . is a commitment to, and there-
fore also a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justifica-
tion that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about
the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideologi-
cal, philosophical, or visionary .. . .The formalism I have in
mind characteristically invokes impersonal purposes, policies,
and principles as an indispensable component of legal reasoning.
44. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary De-
fense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 823 (1985).
45. Id. at 822-23.
46. Kairys, Freedom of Speech. supra note 23, at 161.
47. For similar ideas, see also, Gordon, supra note 42, at 282-86.
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This thesis can be restated as the belief that lawmaking and law
application differ fundamentally . . . . Lawmaking and law ap-
plication diverge in both how they work and how their results
may properly be justified. To be sure, law application may have
an important creative element. But in the politics of law making
the appeal to principle and policy - when it exists at all - is
supposed to be both more controversial in its foundations and
more indeterminate in its implications than the corresponding
features of legal analysis.
By objectivism I mean the belief that the authoritative legal
materials - the system of statutes, cases, and accepted legal
ideas - embody and sustain a defensible scheme of human as-
sociation. They display, though always imperfectly, an intelligi-
ble moral order. Alternatively they show the results of practical
constraints upon social life - constraints such as those of eco-
nomic inefficiency - that, taken together with constant human
desires, have a normative force. The laws are not merely the
outcome of contingent power struggles or of practical pressures
lacking in rightful authority.'
8
What, then, are the problems with these concepts?
The problem with formalism is that it suggests a closed, tightly
constructed, deductive system of judicial decision-making when in
fact all decision-making, including legal, is open-ended, flexible, and
contingent on the system of beliefs accepted by the decision-maker. 49
Objectivism suggests an authoritative, well-defined and morally jus-
tifiable ordering of human relations that makes life comfortable, pre-
dictable, orderly, and coherent while simultaneously masking the de-
basement and moral impoverishment of humanity behind a cloak of
seemingly justified hierarchy.50 Through deconstruction, it is possible
to "reject the common characterization of the law and the state as
neutral, value-free arbiters, independent of and unaffected by social
and economic relations, political forces, and cultural phenomena.""
It will no longer be necessary to mask "the existence of social con-
48. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 2, at 564-65.
49. For further explanation regarding belief systems, see Gordon, supra note 42, at 287-
89.
50. See generally Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 2.
51. Kairys, supra note 21, at 4.
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flict and oppression with ideological myths about objectivity and
neutrality.""2 Finally, law will be revealed as "a major vehicle for
the maintenance of existing social and power relations by the consent
or acquiescence of the lower and middle classes."5 Thus, formalism
and objectivism must be trashed to enable individuals to recognize
the social injustices and inequalities inherent in and perpetuated by
legal liberalism. As a means of understanding the CLS critique of
liberal legalism, a brief examination of their critique of one of the
more common shibboleths of liberalism and liberal legalism, namely,
the concept of rights, will be helpful.
Liberal legalists, according to CLS, are undeniably fond of
"rights-talk. 54 In general, the more rights individuals have, the bet-
ter off they think they will be. When individuals are granted a spe-
cific right, such as the right to bargain collectively, they think that
they can transform substantively human relations, thereby making
society a more humane enterprise. When individuals lack a specific
right, such as a right to health care, they think that, if they could
only obtain this right, if only they could get society to recognize it as
a fundamental human right, then the quality of life would be trans-
formed and, once again, society would be a more humane enterprise.
In short, the more individual rights a society has, the more humane
the social (communitarian) order. There are, however, some real
problems with rights-talk.
Rights-talk alienates individuals from their most important ex-
periences. Rights-talk has the effect of diverting attention from
meaningful life experiences to meaningless, abstract talk about
rights. Tushnet writes:
When I march to oppose the United States intervention in Cen-
tral America, I am "exercising a right" to be sure, but I am
also, and more importantly, being together with friends, affiliat-
ing myself with strangers, with some of who I disagree pro-
foundly, getting cold, feeling alone in the crowd . . . . It is a
form of alienation or reification to characterize this as an in-
stance of "exercising my rights." The experiences become desic-
cated when described in that way. We must insist on preserving
real experiences . . . . The language of rights should be aban-
doned to the very great extent that it takes as a goal the realiza-
tion of the reified abstraction "rights" rather than the experi-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.
54. See generally A Critique of Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
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ence of solidarity and individuality. 5'
In addition, as with so many other liberal platitudes such as equality,
freedom, and justice, rights-talk is counterproductive. "It is not just
that rights-talk does not do much good. In the contemporary United
States, it is positively harmful."56 It is literally quite possible to
starve to death or "die with our rights on" while pursuing the rheto-
ric of rights. "[A]bandoning the rhetoric of rights would be the bet-
ter course to pursue for now. People need food and shelter right now,
and demanding that those needs be satisfied . . . strikes me as more
likely to succeed than claiming that existing rights to food and shel-
ter must be enforced. 57
In addition to these criticisms, Staughton Lynd provides a use-
ful summary of three additional problems with rights-talk.53 First,
the historical documents on which this country's government is based
- the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - contain
"questionable metaphysical assertions about the origin and nature of
rights."5 9 Even if there ever was a general consensus as to what these
rights entailed, which is doubtful, that consensus certainly no longer
exists. Furthermore, a consensus about the nature of rights will never
exist in the future because the idea or notion of rights is "arguably
inconsistent with the modern understanding that the particular soci-
ety into which a person is born shapes that person's ideas about the
world." e6 Second, rights-talk is highly abstract and therefore neces-
sarily incoherent.
Because the language of rights is formalistic and indeterminate,
rather than concrete and specific, the application of a "right" in
a particular setting will depend on factors external to the legal
concepts involved. This causes rights rhetoric to become incoher-
ent, because decisionmakers arbitrarily select varied and often
contradictory rationales to justify outcomes that are not logi-
cally compelled by the premises chosen.6
Thus, rights-talk, as well as talk about legal rules, is no more capa-
ble of predicting a particular outcome when applied to a specific sit-
uation or set of facts than the toss of a coin. Third, "the language of
rights is permeated by the possessive individualism of capitalist soci-
55. Tushnet, supra note 35, at 1382-83.
56. Id. at 1386.
57. Id. at 1394.
58. Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1417 (1984).
59. Id. at 1418.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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ety. "62 According to this view, rights are possessed by individuals
and therefore come to be seen as kinds of property.
As with the tension between active and passive rights noted ear-
lier, 63 the possession of a right by one person necessarily entails the
limitation on a right of another person. For example, if one has a
right to health care, then someone has a corresponding (Hohfeldian)
duty to see that the right is satisfied. That necessarily entails, how-
ever, that certain individuals no longer have a right to exercise their
professional training as they choose. Lynd writes: "Consistent with
this analysis of rights as property, the conventional view implicitly
assumes that the supply of rights is finite, and thus that 'right' is a
scarce commodity. In this view the assertion of one person's right is
likely to impinge on and diminish the rights of others."64 A society
genuinely interested in improving the quality of human life is well-
advised to transcend this ephemeral pursuit of rights. As Lynd has
stated: "If we desire a society in which we share life as a common
creation and genuinely care for each other's needs, then this rhetoric,
which pictures us as separated owners of our respective bundles of
rights, stands as an obstacle."65
Finally, liberal legalism will be delegitimized once the false ide-
ologies behind legal reasoning are recognized. The present concept of
legal reasoning must be debunked."' There is legal reasoning, to be
sure. Once again, however, there is a difference between appearance
and reality. The process of legal reasoning - the utilization of stare
decisis, application of the correct statute or constitutional clause,
and the use of like methods - gives the appearance of an indepen-
dent process capable of arriving at objectively correct results. The
reality, however, is that "social and political judgments about the
substance, parties, and context of a case guide [a judge's] choices,
even when they are not the explicit or conscious basis of decision. '"67
Kairys continues:
The idealized model of the legal process ...is based on the
notion that there is a distinctly legal mode of reasoning and
analysis that leads to and determines "correct" rules, facts, and
results in particular cases. The concept of legal reasoning is es-
sential to the fundamental legitimizing claim of government by
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
64. Lynd, supra note 58, at 1419.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
67. Kairys, supra note 21, at 3.
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law, not people; it purports to distinguish legal analysis and ex-
pertise from the variety of social, political, and economic consid-
erations and modes of analysis that, in a democratic society,
would be more appropriately debated and determined by the
people, not judges."8
The same basic idea is expressed by Kennedy as follows:
Teachers teach nonsense when they persuade students that legal
reasoning is distinct, as a method for reaching correct results,
from ethical and political discourse in general (i.e., from policy
analysis). It is true that there is a distinctive lawyers' body of
knowledge of the rules in force. It is true that there are distinc-
tive lawyers' argumentative techniques for spotting gaps, con-
flicts, and ambiguities in the rules, for arguing broad and nar-
row holdings of cases, and for generating pro and con policy
arguments. But these are only argumentative techniques. There
is never a "correct legal solution" that is other than the correct
ethical and political solution to that legal problem.6
To summarize, CLS focuses its critical artillery on delegitimiz-
ing liberalism and with it, legal liberalism. CLS critiques the notion
of law as a formal, rational, objective, value-neutral system existing
independent from the social-political order in which it is located. The
goal of trashing is to generate a meaningful change in fundamental
human relations in the direction of liberation and the breakdown of
hierarchy. Deconstruction is the means or process by which CLS ex-
poses the contradictions and questionable assumptions of liberal le-
galism. Deconstruction unmasks the myths of formalism and objec-
tivism in the legal order. Delegitimization reveals that legal
reasoning is intimately related to policy. To paraphrase Marx, the
primary CLS goal is to demonstrate that legal scholars have only
interpreted the world and the legal order in various ways. The point,
however, is to change it. CLS desires to change the world account
for the subtitle of Kairys' book, "A Progressive Critique." CLS is
not interested in legal reform; it seeks, rather, to transform social,
political, and legal institutions.
III. The Theory Destructs
It is probably clear by now that CLS poses a challenge to tradi-
tional discussions concerning the nature and role of law in society. If
68. Kairys, supra note 17, at 11.
69. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 40,
47 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (emphasis in original).
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the claims of CLS can be sustained, then one would have to conclude
that most traditional constitutional scholarship and constitutional in-
terpretation threatens the very foundation of a democratic society
while at the same time it unconsciously plays into the hands of those
people who have appointed themselves as guardians of all social-po-
litical values. This in turn serves only to enhance their incredibly
secure position in the economic hierarchy. That, of course, assumes
that CLS theory is sound, which it is not. The elaborate, intricately
involved critiques of CLS mask an inordinately weak and superficial
substructure. It is necessary, and will continue to be necessary, to
analyze the considerable work that has been accomplished regarding
legal analysis from the CLS perspective, but the long-range impact
of the proponents of CLS remains dubious. While their insights will
help redefine legal scholarship in some areas, their overall impact
will parallel that of Fourier's and Owen's, namely, their superficial
philosophy will not sustain their vision of the community, and reality
will continue to be shaped by people who, while not living in dream-
land, from time to time can act on the basis of their dreams. Raising
several problems with CLS theory will demonstrate its structural
weaknesses. The problems raised are systematic rather than
specific.
70
The first problematic issue that springs to mind concerns the
CLS choice and identification of the "enemy." Why did CLS set its
sights on liberalism rather than capitalism? Is it because the philoso-
phy of liberalism appears to provide a pleasant ideological home for
the socially corrupt and divisive nature of capitalism? If that is the
case, then it is the responsibility of CLS to demonstrate that liber-
alism provides more convenient soil in which capitalism can grow
than any other political tradition or ideology, a demonstration they
have not made. A closer analysis of social causation might reveal
that capitalism, as well as any other "ism," can destroy a well-culti-
vated society if the citizens of that society do not maintain it prop-
erly. Liberalism's proponents may not have exercised sufficient dili-
gence in adhering to the principles of liberalism, or sufficient
tenacity in pursuing liberalism's goals, but that is another issue. For
whatever reasons liberalism may have failed, if in fact it has failed,
CLS does not make it clear why the problem is more liberalism than
70. It is not necessary to rehearse the excellent critiques of CLS already in print. Some
of the better critiques include Schwartz, supra note 5; Carter, supra note 44; Hutchinson &
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984).
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capitalism, or why the problems attributed to liberalism do not have
more to do with religion, tradition, history, philosophy, or even cli-
mate. Having found something that looks guilty, the CLS movement
proceeds to punish it without ever fully and adequately inquiring
into whether or not the accused is guilty. This line of inquiry arises,
however, only if the assumption that liberalism provides a home for
capitalism, an extremely questionable assumption, is relied upon.
This faulty assumption is susceptible and will be unmasked.
Locke, for example, one of the leading figures in the history of
liberalism, implies that the accumulation of property could result in
the unequal distribution of social goods and benefits.7 1 That, how-
ever, is only implicit in Locke. There is no clear, necessary relation-
ship between the principles of liberalism and capitalism, unless, of
course, the CLS argument rests on the laissez-faire economic theory
of Adam Smith.7 1 Smith, however, never used the laissez-faire con-
cept with respect to his views on social and political policy. Indeed,
while noninterference of government, free trade, free enterprise, and
freedom of occupational choice are substantively affirmed, Smith
never asserts, implicitly or explicitly, that economic policy is invio-
late. 3 It must be remembered that Smith wrote the Wealth of Na-
tions as a treatise on "political economy." This requires that eco-
nomic policy and political policy can never be radically separated.
Smith would argue for governmental intervention in both the econ-
omy and in individual lives to insure justice, which includes formu-
lating rules, and punishing their infraction, not only with respect to
individual behavior, but also to corporate behavior as well. The gov-
ernment can rightfully engage in quality control and worker protec-
tion. Taxes can be raised to secure order, stability, and community
harmony. In addition, if there is an industry in which a monopoly is
unavoidable, Smith would argue that it should be public rather than
private.74 Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that Smith was a
major moral philosopher.75 It seems most unlikely that Smith would
have justified an economic theory that undermined his emphasis on
the moral sentiments of a community of individuals.
71. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17-31 (R. Cox ed. 1982) (of
property).
72. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (E. Cannan ed. 1976).
73. See generally I SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 72, at 447-524 (Of
Systems of Political Economy); 2 SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 72, at 213-486
(Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth).
74. See 2 A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 72, at 277-78.
75. See, e.g., A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds. 1976).
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It is clear, then, at least in classical liberal theory, that an en-
dorsement of blind, uncontrolled capitalism, a kind of economic an-
archy, is anathema. There is, in short, no necessary connection be-
tween liberalism and capitalism. Why, then, is CLS confused about
this? The confusion may be a failure to distinguish adequately be-
tween liberalism and modernity, which is manifested in Unger's
work, Law and Modern Society."' The pith of Unger's thesis is
found in Chapter 3, entitled "Law and Modernity.""" For Unger, it
is the complexity of modern society that makes it difficult for people
to "live at peace with each other and themselves. ' 78 Why is this con-
dition a failure of liberal society? Is it because society takes Hobbes'
concept of individual greed and self-love more seriously than Marx's
concept of classes and organizations?7 9 If that is the case, then CLS
must explain why Hobbes is taken more seriously than Marx, if that
is the case. Once that hypothesis is supported, CLS must then pro-
ceed to show the precise connection between Hobbes and the myriad
problems confronting contemporary society. The causal connections
on which so much of CLS theory rests remain unexplained and un-
supported. Why the injustice and inequality in today's society issues
ineluctably from liberalism remains a mystery.
Second, even if we could assume that liberalism is a legitimate
target, some effort must be made to define specifically what liber-
alism is. If it is modern liberalism, what distinguishes it from Rous-
sean liberalism or Lockean liberalism? What distinguishes twentieth
century liberalism from eighteenth century liberalism, which is lost
and needs to be recaptured? What, in short, is the theory that is
being considered and why is it fundamentally flawed? Finally, is it
flawed because it leads to injustice and inequality or is it flawed be-
cause it is politically, morally, and ideologically bankrupt?8"
Even if CLS can answer these questions, their problems have
just begun. Assume that liberalism is the problem and that it has
been properly defined and classified. CLS is then open to the critique
of inconsistency. CLS has criticized contemporary legal scholarship,
in part, on the grounds that it fails to acknowledge the indetermi-
nacy of rules and decision-making.81 Tushnet, for example, has ar-
76. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 2.
77. See id. at 134-242.
78. Id. at 167.
79. See id. at 174.
80. See, e.g., T. LOWR. THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
81. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, supra note 2.
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gued that interpretivists82 have difficulty with history, original inten-
tion, and hermeneutics. 83 In short, past beliefs and intentions are not
determinate and identifiable for those who try to understand the
foundational documents8" for our constitutional democracy. One
should ask why they are any more determinate and identifiable for
those who try to critique something as broad as liberalism. At least
there are documents,8 5 records, 86 and theories 87 available for inter-
pretation, as opposed to theories and ideas that, taken together over
a period ranging from Socrates to Mill, constitute a liberal tradition.
If Berger cannot arrive at original understanding 8 and if Ely cannot
interpret historical intentions,8 9 then, to be consistent, CLS cannot
reach a consensus about liberalism. Thus, if liberalism cannot be ad-
equately defined, then it cannot be subjected to a proper critique
either, for then CLS would have done what it claims cannot be done.
The most that CLS has done with respect to liberalism is to erect a
straw man argument and then find that it indeed can be knocked
down.
Third, CLS efforts demonstrating the indeterminacy and
unidentifiability of history and intentions are simultaneously inge-
nious and disingenuous. CLS critique of some legal cases and legal
doctrines has contributed, albeit dubiously, to legal scholarship.
These ingenious analyses demonstrate rather clearly that law is not
independent from the social order in which it finds itself and that
efforts to discover some definite and unchanging historical meaning
is irrevocably subjective and relative. The demonstration itself, how-
ever, while ingenious, is disingenuous for the simple reason that few,
if any, believe in some clearly definable and identifiable past, regard-
ing either meaning or intentions. CLS would profit from reading
George Herbert Mead. ' ° In his Philosophy of the Present,9" Mead
describes the impossibility of discovering some specific past in a the-
oretical and sound manner. One of his examples concerns the histori-
82. As defined by Ely, interpretivism implies "that judges deciding constitutional issues
should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution .... " J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 1 (1980).
83. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, supra note 2, at 793-804.
84. See The Declaration of Independence; The Articles of Confederation; U.S. CONST.
85. See supra note 84.
86. See, e.g., CONG. REC.
87. See, e.g., A. HAMILTON, J. JAY & J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST (H.C. Lodge ed.
1888).
88. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
89. See Ely, supra note 82.
90. G.H. MEAD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT (1959).
91. Id.
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cal fact of Caesar crossing the Rubicon. 9 There is no doubt, Mead
argues, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. That is not the issue. The
issue concerns what the act means, and the meaning is consistently
changing. Each age reinterprets that act, as well as all historical
acts, in light of its present. The past, for Mead, is not static. Rather,
it is shaped by the present. For purposes of constitutional scholar-
ship, Mead would argue that a Constitution exists but that its mean-
ing necessarily changes as society changes. As Heraclitus said, it is
impossible to step in the same river twice. Indeed, Cratylus may be
more correct: one cannot step in the same river once.
Thus, CLS has not discovered anything new here. The liberal
mind, whatever it is, has been aware of the socially contingent and
historically relative nature of reality for quite some time. Why and
how that makes any difference must be explained by CLS. Indeed,
by acknowledging this contingent and subject reality, CLS has un-
dermined its own position. As Hutchinson and Monahan write, "[tlo
sustain any definite vision of future society, the Critical scholars
must renege on their basic commitment to social contingency and
historical relativity. CLS is ultimately hoisted on its own Critical
petard."'9 8
Last, it has been argued by CLS that it is necessary for liberal
theory to discover a definite and easily identifiable interpretation of
an indeterminant text, that is, the Constitution, in order to salvage
judicial review and to refute the claims of CLS." Why that is neces-
sary is not clear. Regardless of the clarity of the text or rule, there
will be conflicting interpretations. What is the problem here? Ac-
cording to CLS, indeterminacy and subjectivity constitute the funda-
mental challenge to the sacred ideal of the rule of law. If there is no
clear constitutional meaning, then the rule of law constitutes little
more than rule by those in power. That deduction, however, is inva-
lid for a variety of reasons.
First, the doctrine of the rule of law contains no specific content.
It represents an ideal. Thus, if decisions are viewed as arbitrary and
illegitimate, the threat posed is to the legal and political order of
society, not necessarily to the rule of law. Plato, for example, wrote
The Laws after realizing that the ideals of The Republic could not
be realized in his world. This does not mean that the philosophy of
92. See id. at 31.
93. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 70, at 233. A similar point is made by
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 430-33.
94. See generally supra note 2, particularly those articles by Tushnet.
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The Laws overrides that of The Republic. By parody of reasoning,
the legal order does not override the rule of law. CLS has engaged in
non sequitur reasoning here in two ways. From the fact that people
cannot agree on constitutional meaning, it does not follow that the
rule of law is problematic. Furthermore, from the fact that those in
power can manipulate the laws of society, it does not follow that the
rule of law is a fanciful notion to be used by the powerful to manipu-
late the powerless. Indeed, as will be seen, it is the rule of law that
provides the powerless with safeguards against the powerful.
Second, CLS is no clearer about what constitutes the rule of
law than it is about what constitutes liberalism. The concept of the
rule of law can be understood in two senses, the real and the ideal.
In establishing government, it is necessary to safeguard against the
abuse of power. There are several ways in which this can be done.
Adopting procedures of selection that delegate authority carefully
and constructing limits on official action is one method. That, how-
ever, may not be enough, for no selection procedure can weed out all
undesirable candidates and no set of limits can foresee ever bur-
geoning realms of official action. In addition, even with the best of
intentions, public officials make mistakes. Is it possible to provide
additional, albeit still incomplete, safeguards against abuse of official
authority? To construct better security against official abuse, J.R.
Lucas argues that society
need[s] to supplement the set of sharply defined procedures
which constitute Process of Law by further procedures, divisions
of authority, limitations of discretion, critiques of the exercise of
discretion, in order to guide and safeguard those in authority,
and enable their decisions to be criticized. These we shall call
the Rule of Law. 3
The Rule of Law, as such, lays down procedural rules governing offi-
cial authority rules, for example, that requiring authorities to "hear
both sides of the case, . . . consider all relevant factors, . . . not be
biased by fear, or favor, or private interest." 96 In addition,
the Rule of Law is expressed in certain vague principles -
Freedom, Justice, Humanity -. . . which should guide the au-
thorities in cases where they are applicable. These principles do
not lay down exactly what is, or is not, to be decided in particu-
lar cases. They are kinds of argument, rather than rigid rules.
97
95. J.R. LUCAS. THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 107 (1966).
96. Id. at 110.
97. Id. at I10-11.
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Interestingly enough, as will be seen shortly, Freedom, Justice,
and Humanity are CLS goals as well. Thus, while there are
problems in formulating precisely the Rule of Law, it is valuable in
limiting constitutional abuses. CLS has failed to distinguish between
the Rule of Law and the Ideal Rule of Law. The Ideal Rule of Law
"presupposes the traditional doctrine of the Separation of Powers,
which is itself only an approximation. "98 Furthermore, "the Ideal
Rule of Law provides the important safeguard that the supreme le-
gal authority may not authorize coercion against any particular per-
son." 99 Obviously, "the Ideal Rule of Law is an ideal only." 100
The Ideal Rule of Law cannot be imposed on the judiciary
wholesale. A functioning system requires greater latitude and flexi-
bility than the Ideal Rule of Law permits. Nevertheless, it represents
one aspect of constitutional limitations and "serves as a valuable bul-
wark against tyranny."9
101
The point of this digression is not to defend a particular concep-
tion of the rule of law. The point is to demonstrate that the concep-
tion of the rule of law is more complex than CLS admits and repre-
sents different ideas with respect to the relationship between law and
society. For the CLS critique of the rule of law to be sustained, CLS
theorists must begin to make clear exactly what it is they find prob-
lematic about this concept.
Third, CLS fails to distinguish between Constitutional Limita-
tions and Constitutional Criticism. Constitutionalism is a broad con-
cept used primarily to denote adherence to a governmental structure
designed to limit the power of the sovereign. More specifically, con-
stitutionalism is defined as "the doctrine or system of government in
which the governing power is limited by enforceable rules of law and
concentration of power is provided by various checks and balances so
that the basic rights of individuals and the groups are protected."102
The concept of constitutionalism as here defined dates back at least
to Plato's Statesman, in which we find the need to limit government
by rules of law. 103 For Lucas, constitutionalism, as a check on unlim-
ited sovereignty, can be understood in two ways, namely, as Consti-
tutional Limitation or as Constitutional Criticism.' 0' Constitutional
98. Id. at 113.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 116.
102. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 486 (1981).
103. See PLATO, STATESMAN (J.B. Skemp trans. 1957).
104. See LuCAS, supra note 95, at 34.
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Limitations restrict the scope of lawful supreme authority. As Lucas
writes:
We may go from saying that not all things are lawful to the
supreme authority, and lay down some of the things that are not
lawful. We cannot, as we have seen, specify exactly the limits of
lawful authority, but we might hope to lay down, not exact, but
outside, limits to the supreme authority.105
Constitutional Criticism, on the other hand, does not restrict the
scope of lawful supreme authority. In Lucas' words:
we may not commit ourselves to limits (of lawful authority),
which since they must be outside the limits must allow too
much, but rather reserve the right to criticize at any time the
decisions of the supreme authority as being "unconstitutional"
or "not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution." 10,
The British practice is one of Constitutional Criticism, the Ameri-
can, one of Constitutional Limitation.
In this context, it seems that CLS would support Constitutional
Criticism while rejecting Constitutional Limitation, although both
could exist together. CLS would support Constitutional Criticism be-
cause Constitutional Criticism, like CLS, bases its position on shared
values of community. The government that violates those values can
be roundly criticized. Unfortunately, in such a system, there is no
clear recourse to any particular legal or political remedy. Constitu-
tional Criticism provides a basis for argument, but not for action.
Constitutional Limitation, however, overcomes the defect of in-
action in Constitutional Criticism. Under Constitutional Limitation,
sovereign action can be declared unconstitutional. Granted, the scope
of Constitutional Limitation will be large, thus permitting unlawful
acts within that broad range. Constitutional Limitation, in general,
cannot prevent governmental abuse without creating a horrendous
amount of legislative rules, a task that is, for all practical purposes,
impossible. In addition, those limits themselves may be so vague that
no one can be sure whether a particular act falls within the legiti-
mate constitutional range. These difficulties, however, have been mit-
igated successfully through the process of judicial review.
This admirable creation [the Constitution] is detailed enough to
leave nobody in much doubt about the proper procedures of gov-
ernment, without, save in a few minor respects, being so detailed
105. Id. at 36-37.
106. Id. at 39.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
as to prevent the natural change of the content of government
from one generation to another: and it includes enough state-
ments for general principle to communicate to any reader the
spirit of the Constitution, while ensuring by means of judicial
review, that the other organs of government cannot disregard
the general principles it has set out. In this way, the Constitu-
tion lays down limits, which are clear enough in normal circum-
stances, but which, if a new situation does arise where the appli-
cation is not clear, can be given an authoritative
interpretation. 
07
Resting such power in one branch of government raises the
question of who the guardians are. This question, however, is not an
issue here. The issue at this point is addressed to the nature of the
two methods of constitutionalism, where CLS stands, and why. If
CLS rejects both forms of constitutionalism, what will provide ade-
quate checks and balances in their form of government? If Constitu-
tional Criticism is adequate, then what are citizens to do about an
egregious abuse of sovereign power? Are revolution or emigration
their only alternatives? In addition, how will CLS determine the
community of interest necessary to sustain critique of inappropriate
governmental decision-making? If Constitutional Limitation is the
chosen method to achieve control over the sovereign, how will the
CLS constitution differ from the one in present use? Finally, will
society be able to avoid some form of judicial review that will re-
quire interpretation of the new constitution? If so, how?
To summarize this fourth point, this Article is intended to illus-
trate that the concept of the rule of law is far more complex than
CLS admits and that its indeterminate and subjective qualities are
more of a strength than a weakness. In addition, the failure of CLS
to define terms continues to detract from its criticism. For example,
does CLS oppose the rule of law as it is found in Constitutional Lim-
itation, Constitutional Criticism, or both? If both, then what will
CLS substitute for the rule of law concept, or why will substitution
be unnecessary? On these issues of foundation, CLS is as indetermi-
nate and subjective as the system it seeks to delegitimize.
CLS theorists have gotten away with a great deal of criticism,
for they have not had to concern themselves with the ongoing man-
agement of society. The role of critic suits them well. What happens,
however, when the role of critic must be replaced by the role of man-




As strong as the CLS critique is with respect to constitutional
scholarship, 08 it is comparatively weak with respect to positive vision
and reconstruction. CLS wants to bring down a social structure, but
they have nothing with which to replace it, except, of course, some
hackneyed "liberal" calls for freedom and equality, democracy, and
some form of socialism. Brest, for example, admits that he has
neither an agenda nor a political theory, and that, at best, CLS rep-
resents "amicus Briefs" designed to convince others "to adopt [its]
various notions of the public good." 109 In addition, society should be
reconstructed as "one in which the concept of freedom includes citi-
zen participation in the community's public discourse and responsi-
bility to shape its values and structure."" 0 Peter Gabel argues that
society must transform the production process and hence the social
process to achieve justice rather than just tinker with the system. He
adds that
[individuals] can create the possible conditions for a concrete
justice - that is, the possible conditions for a living milieu in
which human labor is a creative social activity, in which the pro-
duction of material goods is purposefully designed to satisfy real
human needs, and in which each person recognizes the other as
''one-of-us" instead of "other-than-me" irrespective of sex or
skin color."'
Gerald Frug argues that it is necessary to decentralize power in
our society by returning power to the city or, perhaps, Plato's or
Rousseau's city-state." 2 In arguing "that real power must be given
to the cities," Frug holds that this could be done in several ways.
Cities, for example, could regain power by creating city banks and
city insurance companies, and reorganizing the city "as a vehicle for
new forms of organization and popular participation. '"" 3 Unger iden-
tifies needs that must be met, including the needs (1) to reshape
society to enhance personal and interpersonal relationships; (2) to
rethink and restructure democracy to avoid private interest groups
and de facto disfranchisement of minorities; (3) to reorganize gov-
ernment to make it more effective while preventing it from curtailing
freedom; (4) to reorganize the economy to enhance individual initia-
108. While that critique may not be very strong, that is its strongest position.
109. Brest, supra note 2, at 1109.
110. Id.
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112. Frug, supra note 2, at 1150.
113. Id. at 1150-51.
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tive and creativity without enslaving the social and political order;
and (5) to redefine and securely establish a system of rights designed
to enhance autonomy.'
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It is seriously doubtful that anyone would oppose these ideals.
Such opposition would be tantamount to an opposition to peace. One
must ask, however, what any of this means. How can these wonder-
ful goals be achieved? Why are they any less vague than the rule of
law? Why are they more liberating than liberalism? Unger goes so
far as to refer to his vision as superliberalism. Yet, and to use his
own words, it is impossible to see how his vision, or any other CLS
vision, avoids being "just another variant of the mythic, antiliberal
republic,"" 5 or little more than "some preposterous synthesis of the
established democracies.""16 In short, the efforts of CLS at recon-
struction strike one as little more than fanciful flights into an imagi-
nary world of political theory and practice. CLS must improve its
reconstructive skills if it ever expects to have its efforts taken seri-
ously. Furthermore, if its reform efforts are not taken seriously, it
will not be long before the critical efforts of CLS will be ignored. It
is incumbent on CLS to get its constructive house in order.
Sixth, CLS is unable to distinguish political reasoning from le-
gal reasoning. Kairys' claim, of course, that law is nothing more
than an extension of politics,"1 renders such a distinction unneces-
sary. Kairys' claim is, however, at best simplistic and at worst, a
misrepresentation. Contrary to the claims of CLS, there are differ-
ences between law and politics, and between legal systems and politi-
cal systems. This statement is not intended to mean that there are no
similarities or that these concepts do not overlap or that they are not
periodically and, under certain circumstances, influenced by one an-
other. There is no more strict separation between law and politics
than there is between law and morality. That does not mean, how-
ever, that there is no separation whatsoever or that there should not
be some separation. Indeed, a society governed by a system in which
all politics is law and all law is politics would be criticized on the
grounds that it failed to separate the two fields.
In looking for a distinction between law and politics, one does
not have to go any further than Virginia Held's essay on legal and
political justification." 8 Held argues, quite correctly, that legal and
114. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 2, at 586-602.
115. Id. at 602.
116. Id.
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political modes of reasoning are distinct and distinguishable. She
writes, for example, that "deontological justification is especially
characteristic of and appropriate to legal systems, teleological jus-
tification especially characteristic of and appropriate to political
systems."'119 Since law, for CLS, is nothing more than an extension
of politics, there is no need for CLS to distinguish between political
and legal systems and their respective modes of reasoning and deci-
sional justification. In blurring the relevant distinguishing character-
istics between law and politics, CLS misrepresents the different
methods of decisional justification. Regarding the difference in meth-
ods of justification, Held writes:
[I]f it is thought that in difficult cases the judge is free to reach
beyond the existing legal system to moral principles not yet in-
corporated into it, these principles ought not to be deontological
ones. Thus, if existing rules of a legal system do not provide
grounds for a decision, and if appeal to those principles which
have already been the basis for prior judicial decision is still in-
adequate, a judge may appeal to such deontological moral prin-
ciples as that no person should profit from his wrong doing, or
that courts ought not to allow their decisions to be inequitable or
unjust. But, appeal to a utilitarian prescription for the max-
imization of happiness would not be appropriate ....
The range of political decisions, on the other hand, covers
those which are predominantly concerned with results. Charac-
teristically, political decisions are wagers on the expected good
consequences their defenders hope to bring about, and deonto-
logical factors are often appropriately put aside. The concepts of
welfare and public interest, essential for evaluations of political
decisions, are properly best understood in teleological terms. The
issues they raise cannot adequately be dealt with by reference to
legal rights and obligations.""
There is a sense in which law is an extension of politics - polit-
ics, after all, gives effect to law - but it is not a sense that would
concern or trouble most people. CLS thinks it is onto something
here, but again, its inability to draw clear definitions and adequately
explain the nature of the concepts under which critical review takes
place precludes them from recognizing the fundamentally different
natures inherent in those concepts. Indeed, it is because there is a
difference that society knows when either system is going wrong. In-
deed, if there were no difference, then society would know it had no
119. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 13-14.
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problem. If the claim of CLS is that in our system of government
there is no difference, then that claim must be supported. Even if
that claim is supported, however, it does not necessarily support the
theory of CLS. All that CLS theorists will have done is indicate that
there is no difference when, in fact, there should be one, and, if there
should be one, that is the difference liberal theory has long acknowl-
edged. The CLS claim that there is no difference between law and
politics is not only specious, it is also pointless.
IV. Conclusion
Until such time that CLS can provide a more substantial social
and political theory, and one that properly locates the relationship
between law and politics in that context, rather than opt for either
nihilism or Marxism, this author prefers to tinker with the constitu-
tional democracy presently in place. In doing so, however, the criti-
ques of constitutional scholarship made by CLS will not be ignored.
Their long-range contribution to legal scholarship, if any, will be in
their unorthodox approach to legal analysis. Their higher aspirations
will not, indeed cannot, be fulfilled. The problems of constitutional
democracy will remain, and with them, the problem of judicial re-
view. Fleeing to the fantasyland of CLS will not move society any
closer to the resolution of these problems or even toward the realiza-
tion of any CLS values, as diffuse as they are. Utopian socialism in
the nineteenth century held out hope for many that there could be a
better world in which to live. It would be pleasant to think that this
new wave could do the same for the twentieth century. Today's soci-
ety is richer because of the work of those nineteenth century utopian
socialists. This author hopes CLS can make the same caliber of con-
tribution in the twentieth. Given what the advocates of CLS have
produced thus far, however, there is little to indicate that they will
be as successful as their intellectual ancestors.
